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Limiting the Use of Prior Felony Convictions
to Impeach a Defendant-Witness in
California Criminal Proceedings
At common law an individual convicted of a felony, a misde-
meanor involving dishonesty, or obstruction of justice was in-
competent as a witness.1 The rationale for this disqualification
was a belief such persons were so destitute of moral honesty
that "truth could not within them dwell."'2
In the middle 1800's the common law prohibition was ab-
rogated in most jurisdictions.3 The statutory modifications gen-
erally provided a person convicted of a crime could testify but
allowed the opponent to introduce the witness' criminal past for
the purpose of impeaching his credibility.4 Although the type of
conviction admissible for impeachment purposes varied widely
among jurisdictions,5 Wigmore states three general views devel-
oped:
1. An individual could be impeached by the same type of conviction
which would have led to disqualification at common law.
2. Any criminal conviction could be used to impeach.
3. Only convictions for crimes indicating bad character could be
used for impeachment purposes.6
Although it is unclear when California first abandoned the
common law disqualification, 7 the enactment of Section 2051 of
the Code of Civil Procedure in 1872 clearly marked California's
departure from the common law rule.8
1. See, 1 GREENLEAF, EVIDENCE § 372 (16th ed. 1899); MCCORMICK, LAW OF
EVIDENCE § 43 (2d ed. 1972); 3A WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 980 (1970).
2. Williams v. United States, 3 F.2d 129, 130 (8th Cir. 1924).
3. See, 3A WIGMORE, supra note 1 § 985.
4. For a general review of the form statutory modification took, see 98
CORPUS JURIS SECUNDUM 407-410 (1957).
5. See, 3A WIGMORE, supra note 1 §987.
6. Id. § 980.
7. Two 1870 cases are typical of the confusion which existed at that time.
In both cases the actual issue was what effect the best evidence rule had on
proving up the prior conviction. In People v. Melvane, 39 Cal. 614 (1870) the
prior conviction was to be used to disqualify the witness as incompetent. Howev-
er, in People v. McDonald, 39 Cal. 697 (1870), the prior conviction was to be used
for impeachment purposes. Hence confusion exists as to the actual law as of
that date.
8. CAL. CODE OF CIv. PROC. § 2051 (West 1965) reads: "A witness may be
impeached by the party against whom he was called, by contradictory evidence
A witness convicted of a crime which constitutes a basis of
impeachment faces a dilemma. He can testify and risk impeach-
ment by the introduction of his prior criminal convictions or he
can refrain from testifying to avoid impeachment, thus losing
the opportunity to present his own account. This dilemma, when
faced by a defendant in a criminal proceeding, can have great
consequences.
In theory, a criminal defendant faces no greater dilemma than
a non-party witness since he is entitled to an instruction limiting
the jury's use of evidence of prior conviction to the issue of his
veracity, but as pointed out in one case, "the naive assumption
that prejudicial effects can be overcome by instructions to the
jury [is one] all practicing lawyers know to be unmitigated fic-
tion."9 Judge Hand pointed out that asking jurors to limit the
use of particular evidence to only one issue was requiring "men-
tal gymnastic which is beyond not only their power, but any-
body else's."'10
A 1966 study of jury conduct indicated that when the strength
of the evidence against defendants was constant, the jury's
awareness of a particular defendant's prior conviction almost
doubled the liklihood of conviction when compared to cases
where the jury was unaware of the defendant's earlier convic-
tions.1
As a result, there is little doubt that many criminal defendants
elect not to testify rather than provide the prosecution an oppor-
tunity to make the jury aware of their prior criminal conduct.
Thus the defendant forbears exercising the right to testify, a
right the Supreme Court held "basic in our system of jurispru-
dence"' 2 because he fears the jury will improperly use the evi-
dence of prior conviction.
In light of these considerations the California Supreme Court
has followed the lead of other jurisdictions in limiting the cir-
cumstances in which a prior conviction may be admitted to
impeach a witness.'
3
or by evidence that his general reputation for truth, honesty or integrity is bad,
but not by evidence of particular wrongful acts, except that it may be shown by
the examination of the witness, or the record of the judgment that he had been
convicted of a felony ... " (emphasis added).
9. Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949).
10. Nash v. United States, 54 F.2d 1006, 1007 (2d Cir. 1932).
11. Kalven & Zeisel, THE AMERICAN JURY (1966).
12. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948).
13. Among those calling for reform were The Model Code of Evidence, rule
106; The Uniform Rules of Evidence 21; The federal courts; see also, Luck v.
United States, 348 F.2d 763 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
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Until 1972 the application of Section 2051 of the Code of Civil
Procedure and its recodification, Section 788 of the Evidence
Code, 14 by the California courts was mechanical. Any witness
could be impeached with any prior conviction not too remote in
time. 15 As one author charitably stated, it was an approach "at
least simple to apply.' '1 6 In 1950 William Hale wrote, "in its
application the statute [Section 2051] has presented few prob-
lems."' 7 The problems that did arise were concerned mainly
with cases where conviction was too remote and with the extent
to which the prosecution could reveal the details of a prior
offense.'8
In 1972 the California Supreme Court decided People v.
Beagle.19 Beagle had appealed his conviction for attempted ar-
son and arson. During the trial the prosecution asked Beagle
(who had elected to testify) if he had been convicted of a felony
in 1965 (issuing a check with sufficient funds). Beagle admit-
ted the conviction; the jury was instructed on the limited im-
peachment purpose for which the evidence had been admitted.
On appeal Beagle contended that since his prior conviction
bore no relationship to either of the offenses charged or his
veracity, impeachment by such evidence was a restriction on his
right to testify constituting a denial of due process. The court
rejected Beagle's challenge stating it misconstrued the law as
well as the nature of the prior offense.
20
In reaching its decision the court for the first time considered
the relationship between Evidence Code Sections 788 and 352.21
14. In 1965 California revamped its rules of evidence with the enactment of
a comprehensive evidence code. Rules of evidence formerly scattered in several
California codes were brought within the new Evidence Code. Section 788 reads
in part: "For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, it may be
shown by the examination of the witness, or by the record of the judgment that
he has been convicted of a felony..." The comments to the code state: "Section
788 is based on Section 2051 of the Code of Civil Procedure ... As Section 788
is, in substance, a recodification of existing law it will have no effect on the
case developed rules..." CAL. EVID. CODE § 780 (West 1969).
15. See HALE, SPECIFIC ACTS AND RELATED MATTERS AS AFFECTING CREDI-
BILITY, 1 HASTINGS, L.J. 89 (1950).
16. MCCORMICK, supra note 1 p. 85.
17. HALE, supra note 15, p. 99.
18. Id. 102-107. See also, 54 Cal. Jur. 2d 570 (1969).
19. 6 Cal. 3d 441, 492 P.2d 1, 99 Cal. Rptr. 313 (1972).
20. Id. 451, 492 P.2d at 6-7, 89 Cal. Rptr. 318-19.
21. Id. 451, 492 P.2d at 7, 99 Cal. Rptr. 319.
Section 788 states a prior felony conviction may be used for the
purpose of impeachment.2 2 Section 352 in fact provides that the
court may exclude relevant evidence "if the probative value is
substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission
will. . . create danger of undue prejudice. .. 23 Reviewing the
relationship between these sections the court held Section 352
was a general provision of the Evidence Code which applies to
evidence admissible under other sections of the Code.24 Citing
the Code's use of the permissive "MAY" in Section 788 rather
than the mandatory "SHALL," the court held Section 788 when
read in conjunction with Section 352 gave the trial court discre-
tion as to whether a prior conviction should be admitted.25 To
assist the trial courts in exercising their discretion the court
quoted from Gordon v. United States, 26 wherein Judge Berger
(now Chief Justice) indicated "the more important factors to be
considered by the trial court."
In common human experience acts of deceit, fraud, cheating, or steal-
ing, for example, are universally regarded as conduct which reflects
adversely on a man's honesty and integrity. Acts of violence. . . gen-
erally have little or no direct bearing on honesty and veracity. [I]A
'rule of thumb' thus should be that convictions which rest on dishon-
est conduct relate to credibility whereas those of violent or assaul-
tive crimes generally do not ... [2] The nearness or remoteness of the
prior conviction is also a factor of no small importance. Even one
involving fraud or stealing, for example, if it occurred long before and
has been followed by a legally blameless life, should generally be
excluded on the ground of remoteness. [Par.] A special and even more
difficult problem arises when the prior conviction is for the same or
substantially similar conduct for which the accused is on trial. Where
multiple convictions of various kinds can be shown, strong reasons
arise for excluding those which are for the same crime because of the
inevitable pressure on lay jurors to believe that 'if he did it before he
probably did so this time.' [3] As a general guide, those convictions
which are for the same crime should be admitted sparingly. . . [4]
One important consideration is what the effect will be if the defend-
ant does not testify out of fear of being prejudiced because of im-
peachment by convictions. Even though a judge might find that the
prior convictions are relevant to credibility and the risk of prejudice
to the defendant does not warrant their exclusion, he may neverthe-
less conclude that it is more important that the jury have the benefit of
the defendant's version of the case than to have the defendant remain
silent out of fear of impeachment. 27
Adopting this discretionary standard, the court rejected any
constitutional challenge to the use of prior convictions. Re-
22. CAL. EVID. CODE § 788 (West 1968).
23. CAL. EvID. CODE § 352 (West 1968).
24. 6 Cal. 3d at 452, 492 P.2d at 8, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 320.
25. Id. at 453, 492 P.2d at 8, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 320.
26. 383 F.2d 936 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
27. 6 Cal. 3d at 553,492 P.2d at 8, 99 Cal. Rptr. 320, quoting Gordon v. United
States, 383 F.2d 936, 940-41.
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sponding specifically to Beagle's claim that Section 788 was an
improper restriction on his right to testify the court stated, "We
do not propose to encourage or countenance a form of black-
mail by defendants. No witness including a defendant who
elects to testify on his own behalf is entitled to a false aura of
veracity. '28 The court also quoted People v. Modesto,29 "[tihe
defendant must weigh the danger of impeachment by the in-
troduction of prior convictions for every witness he calls for the
defense. 'The fact that the witness may also be the defendant
makes the choice more difficult but a denial of due process does
not emerge from the circumstances' (Adamson v. Califor-
nia3 0)."'3 1 Hence Beagle appears to place California in accord
with the federal court's rejection of claims asserting constitu-
tional infirmity of impeachment via prior convictions. Thus
Beagle's restriction on the use of prior convictions is limited
solely to the trial court's discretionary finding of undue preju-
dice under Section 352.
In 1975 the court again addressed the issue of prior convic-
tions for impeachment purposes in People v. Lent.32 The appel-
lant had been convicted of grand theft. During the trial the
prosecution was permitted to introduce evidence of the appel-
lant's prior misdemeanor convictions for the purpose of im-
peachment. Reading Section 788 as allowing only the use of
felony convictions, the court "declined the invitation to extend
its [Section 788] to misdemeanors." 33 Most important was the
court's statement: "[T]he current trend is toward refinement
and limitation of the use of even prior felonies for impeach-
ment.,
34
The case which imposed the greatest limitation on the use of
prior conviction was the 1976 case of People v. Rist.35 Rist is
interesting for two reasons. First it is perhaps the poorest ap-
plicaton of Beagle standards yet to be reviewed. Second, ac-
28. Id. at 553, 492 P.2d at 8, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 320.
29. 62 Cal. 2d 426, 454, 398 P.2d 753, 42 Cal. Rptr. 417, 427 (1965).
30. 332 U.S. 46, 57-58 (1947).
31. 6 Cal. 3d at 453-54, 492 P.2d at 8, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 320.
32. 15 Cal. 3d 481, 541 P.2d 545, 124 Cal. Rptr. 905 (1975).
33. Id. at 485, 541 P.2d at 547, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 907.
34. Id.
35. 16 Cal. 3d 211, 545 P.2d 833, 127 Cal. Rptr. 457 (1976).
cording to the dissent, the discretion granted to trial courts in
Beagle was replaced by a rigid standard.
Rist was tried and convicted of first degree robbery. Before
taking the stand the defendant moved to exclude his prior conv-
ictions under the Beagle standards. Three prior convictions
were at issue, a 1973 conviction for robbery and 1971 convictions
for forgery and possession of marijuana. The trial court ruled
although the robbery conviction could be used to impeach the
defendant, the 1971 convictions could not.
This ruling seems to disregard the standards set out in
Beagle. The admission of a prior robbery in the instant robbery
trial seemed to ignore Beagle's admonishment to use prior con-
victions for the same offense "sparingly." This is particularly
true when another conviction, highly relevant on the issue of
honesty, the forgery conviction, was available to impeach the
witness. The exclusion of the forgery conviction seems again to
ignore the Beagle standards as it was relevant on the issue of
honesty, dissimilar to the offense charged, and not too remote in
time. In its decision the court notes "[i]t appears that the trial
court gave only perfunctory consideration to the Beagle
guidelines. ' 36 In responding to the trial court's decision to admit
the robbery conviction, counsel for Rist stated, "Your Honor, it
would seem to me that this is exactly what Beagle indicates
should not happen. ' 37 Having received this unfavorable ruling,
Rist decided not to testify.
In reviewing the propriety of using a similar prior conviction
the court expanded its Beagle guidelines to such a degree that
one court later stated. Rist almost said, "Never use a similar
prior."38 In actuality the court stated:
As a general rule, convictions which are assaultive in nature do not
weigh as heavily in the balance favoring admissibility as those convic-
tions which are based on dishonesty or some other lack of integrity.
Nor do prior convictions which are dissimilar to the crime charged
weigh as heavily in the balance favoring exclusion as those which are
the same as or similar to the crime charged. The temporal nature of
the prior conviction may affect the balance either for or against ad-
missibility-a recent conviction of a dissimilar crime grounded on a
dishonest act would add weight in favor of admissibility, but a recent
conviction of a similar, assaultive crime would add weight in favor of
exclusion as the prejudicial effect would therefore be even greater.39
Thus the court indicated that the balance should be in favor of
exclusion of similar prior convictions rather than requiring ab-
36. Id. at 219, 545 P.2d at 840, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 453, n.9.
37. Id.
38. People v. Rollo, 60 Cal. App. 3d 362 (1976) vacated by grant of cert. 4
Crim. 7743 (1976).
39. 16 Cal. 3d at 222.
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solute exclusion. The dissent apparently believed the balance
was tipped so far in favor of exclusion that the prosecution
could never meet the burden, hence they believed a rigid stan-
dard was imposed.4 ° Complaining that Beagle had indicated
there was no constitutional bar to the use of convictions to
impeach, the dissent indicated the majority, without any legal
basis, was attaching to Section 788 a limitation the legislature
had not intended.4 '
In view of the court's desire to limit the use of prior convic-
tions the court's continued unwillingness to find any constitu-
tional infirmity in their use is one of the most significant aspects
of the Rist case.
In contrast, at least one state, Hawaii, has held impeachment
by prior convictions violates an accused's constitutional
rights.4 2 In reaching its decision the Hawaiian court carefully
noted its holding was based on both the federal and state con-
stitutions.4 3 Indicative of Hawaii's solitary position is the fact
that section of the opinion holding the use of prior convictions
unconstitutional is entirely devoid of supportive authority.4 4
Having failed to adopt a conclusive position similar to
Hawaii's, the California court has left the area open to piece-
meal litigation, similar to Rist. In such litigation the court will
be asked to review discretionary decisions of trial courts made
under uncertain guidelines. The potential for conflicting appel-
late court decisions is apparent.45
Development of a more workable standard would avoid con-
tinued uncertainty. A highly workable standard which could be
40. Id. at 224, 545 P.2d at 842, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 466.
41. Id. at 223, 545 P.2d at 842, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 455. Support for the dissent-
er's opinion as to the legislative intent is found in a recent article in the Los
Angeles Daily Journal, March 4,1977, at 1 Col. 5, wherein Assemblyman McAlis-
ter stated he was introducing a bill to "restore its (Section 788) true and original
legislative meaning." McAlister claimed Beagle and Rist judicially reversed the
law as it had stood for a century.
42. See State v. Santiago, 53 Hawaii 254, 492 P.2d 657 (1971) holding use of
prior convictions to impeach violates an accused's constitutional right to testify.
43. Id. at 258, 492 P.2d 661.
44. Id.
45. Pending before the Supreme Court now is a conflict between the appel-
late courts as to the right of the prosecution to introduce the actual felony
committed rather than simply ask if the defendant had been convicted of a
felony.
derived from Beagle is a relevancy standard. As the court noted
in People v. Antick,46 "[w]e interpreted the permissive language
of the statute [Section 788] to mean that the introduction of
other relevant evidence is subject to the exclusionary rule em-
bodied in Section 352. ' '17 This statement assumes a prior convic-
tion is indeed relevant evidence. It may, in fact, be an assump-
tion which is without foundation. The only issue upon which the
prior conviction is admitted is the veracity of the witness. When
one assumes a conviction is relevant to veracity one assumes a
conviction implies impaired veracity. Is the assumption cor-
rect? Hale stated: "Until such inquiry can be answered we
cannot know whether and to what extent conviction of a crime
has an impeaching value. ' 48 Wigmore wrote: "[T]o the psycholo-
gist, the common law's reliance on character as an index of
falsehood is crude and childish. 49
The California Evidence Code defines relevant evidence as
that "having any tendency in reason to prove or disprove any
disputed fact. .. 50 Thus, prior convictions are relevant only if
they have a tendency to prove or disprove the honesty of the
witness. Section 350 of the Evidence Code states only relevant
evidence is admissible.51 Section 403 of the Evidence Code
places on the proponent of proferred evidence the burden of
producing evidence of any preliminary facts when the relevan-
cy of the proferred evidence depends on the existence of the
preliminary fact.5
2
Since Beagle held Section 788 is subject to other general pro-
visions of the Evidence Code,53 it follows that this section should
also be subject to the relevancy requirement of Section 210. A
prerequisite to admission under this procedure would be a
showing that the evidence of conviction tends to prove or dis-
prove veracity. Inasmuch as Section 403 places the burden of
producing evidence of preliminary facts on the proponent, the
prosecution should bear the burden of showing a witness' prior
conviction to be an indication of impaired veracity.
Clearly the relevancy of a specific felony conviction on the
issue of veracity is contingent on a showing of a correlation
46. 15 Cal. 3d 79, 539 P.2d 454, 123 Cal. Rptr. 475 (1975).
47. Id. at 97, 539 P.2d at 55, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 487.
48. HALE, supra note 15, p. 99.
49. 3A WIGMORE, supra note 1, S.922.
50. CAL. EVID. CODE § 210 (West 1969).
51. CAL. EVID. CODE § 350 (West 1968).
52. CAL. EVID. CODE § 403 (West 1968).
53. See note 24 supra.
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between the criminal history of the witness and lack of veracity.
Certainly the prosecution's burden is greater than "crude, chil-
dish" reliance on unproven assumptions. Beagle pointed out that
"[a]cts of violence ... generally have little or no direct bearing
on honesty or veracity." 4 If this is true, evidence of such acts
should be excluded as irrelevant rather than unduly prejudicial.
Adoption of the relevancy standard need not result in the
abandonment of the application of Section 352 to Section 788.
However, it would shift the initial focus away from prejudice to
relevancy. Once a trial court found a particular conviction rele-
vant on the issue of veracity, the court could then consider the
issue of undue prejudice. Thus, a two-level test would evolve
from Beagle.
At the first level relevancy would be considered. Included in
this consideration would be the first two "factors" which were
stated in Beagle. Does the prior conviction rest on dishonest
conduct or violent conduct? How remote is the prior conviction?
Under Section 403 the prosecution should bear the burden of
showing the relevancy of these factors on the issue of the wit-
ness' veracity.
Once the prosecution has met its burden, if the defendant
elects, he may then raise the second level of the test, i.e. the
admission of the evidence as unduly prejudicial. Here the final
two factors of Beagle should be considered. Is the prior convic-
tion for the same or a similar offense as the one the accused is
presently charged? Will the defendant's failure to testify out of
fear of impeachment unduly prejudice the trial? Under Section
352 the defendant should bear the burden of showing undue
prejudice.
This proposal retains the elements of the Beagle guidelines,
by clearly focusing on two considerations, relevancy and undue
prejudice, the guidelines become easier to apply. Additionally,
the approach places the burden of proof upon the party seeking
to benefit from a particular ruling rather than the present catch-
all procedure. Finally, under this approach only convictions
which actually bear on credibility would be admitted. This, in
the author's opinion, will achieve the limitation on the use of
54. 6 Cal. 3d at 553, 492 P.2d at 8, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 320.
prior convictions the court has been seeking while preserving
for the People the opportunity to use evidence traditionally
admissible for the purpose of impeachment when that evidence
has true probative value on credibility.
RICHARD E. BOEHM
